Requirement Contracts in Bankruptcy by Pingel, Gary B.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 49 | Issue 1 Article 10
1969
Requirement Contracts in Bankruptcy
Gary B. Pingel
University of Nebraska College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Gary B. Pingel, Requirement Contracts in Bankruptcy, 49 Neb. L. Rev. 157 (1970)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol49/iss1/10
Comment
REQUIREMENT CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY
INTRODUCTION
In this age of ever increasing needs for goods and services,
requirement contracts have come to play an important role in
allowing a company to tailor-make its contracts to fit not only
present needs but also its future needs. The requirements buyer
promises to order all or a certain percentage of his requirements
from only the requirements seller in return for the seller's promise
to fill all of the buyer's orders.'
Output contracts are very similar to requirement contracts ex-
cept that fluctuations in the amount of goods involved under the
former are contingent on the seller's output instead of the buyer's
requirements because of the seller's promise to deliver his output,
or a percentage of his output, only to the buyer. This distinction
between requirement and output contracts has no significant bearing
on the general rules applied to these two types of contracts when a
breach is involved. Therefore, for the purpose of this article the
term "requirements contract" will be considered to include output
contracts.
Requirement contracts allow a company to increase and decrease
its orders in relation to its needs, placing the company in an advan-
tageous position to that held by companies with nonfluctuating
supply contracts. However, this position is not always as advan-
tageous as it would seem, especially when the needs of the require-
ment buyer are vastly increased, decreased or ceased altogether.
When the latter occurs upon the bankruptcy of the buyer, whether
voluntary or involuntary, the position of the parties is uncertain.
Although there are several articles that have analyzed, in depth,
I 'Thile older cases viewed such contracts as lacking in mutuality and
consideration, because the buyer in a requirements contract might
refrain from having requirements or the seller in an output con-
tract might have no output, since the second or third decade of this
century there has been a general rejection of the view. In substitu-
tion, most courts have found support for the return performance either
in an implied promise to continue requirements at a level approxi-
mately equivalent to experience up to the time of contracting, or in
an implied promise to remain or start in business and have good faith
requirements. Probably the widest accepted position has been that
a requirements or output contract involved the implied promise not
to buy from suppliers or not to sell to other purchasers." R.
DUESENBERG & L. KiNG, SALES & BuLK SALES UNDER THE UNiFomv
CoAnvRcrAL CODE § 4.05 (1966).
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the rights and duties of the parties to an executory contract in gen-
eral when one of the parties to the contract becomes bankrupt, 2
these analyses are not entirely applicable to requirement contracts.
Requirement contracts, while considered to be a species of executory
contracts, actually are a genus in themselves because of the unique
rules that cover a breach of such contracts. While normally an
executory contract is considered breached when one of the parties
fails to perform within the time limit set for performance,3 that is
generally not true for both parties of a requirements contract. "A
requirements buyer does not breach his contract when requirements
for supplies diminish or when he ceases to have requirements by
reason of his going out of business."'4 This article will deal exclu-
sively with this uniqueness of requirement contracts and how it
affects provable claims in bankruptcy when the requirements buyer
is the bankrupt.
PROVABILITY OF CLAIMS BASED ON
REQUIREMENT CONTRACT BREACHES
The general rule applied to an executory contract, of which one
of the parties to the contract is a bankrupt, was stated by the United
States Supreme Court in Central Trust Company v. Chicago Audi-
torium Association: 5 "Proceedings, whether voluntary or involun-
tary, resulting in an adjudication of bankruptcy, are the equivalent
of an anticipatory breach of an executory agreement....
Although this general rule would seem to encompass all execu-
tory contracts in toto, In re United Cigar Stores Company of
America7 has limited the rule's application in requirement contract
cases to cover only those in which the bankrupt party is not acting
in good faith.8 United Cigar concerned a requirements buyer that
ceased making purchases from its supplier upon filing a petition for
voluntary bankruptcy. The court in its opinion recognized that:
(1) requirement contracts are valid and binding; (2) the bank-
ruptcy of one of the parties to an executory contract does not
excuse his performance; and (3) a claim based on nonperformance
2 Ballantine, Anticipatory Breach and the Enforcement of Contractual
Duties, 22 Micn. L. REv. 329 (1924); Broude, Executory Contracts and
Bankruptcy: The Case for a Federal Common Law, 17 KAN. L. REv. 1
(1968).
3 4 A. CoRBIN, CoRBIN ON CONTRACTS § 943 (1951).
4 Western Fuel & Oil Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1957).
5 240 U.S. 581 (1916).
6 Id. at 592.
7 72 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1934).
8 Id. at 674.
CODMMNTS
is provable against the bankrupt.9 However, it was held that under
the circumstances of the case the contract was not breached because
"though bankruptcy may not excuse a breach, it may have so
changed the buyer's requirements that this contract was not
broken."' 0 The court imposed upon the buyer only the obligation to
act in good faith.11
Thus, the exception to the general rule was established and it
has been the polestar upon which later courts have relied.' Since
the exception only applies to good faith action by the bankrupt, it
would seem that the general rule that bankruptcy is an anticipatory
breach would still apply in all those instances in which the bank-
rupt acts in bad faith. This, because of the broad meaning of "good
faith" that courts have developed,18 has not been substantiated by
case law. However, because of the inherent unsoundness of the gen-
eral rule, courts may be reluctant to apply it even where the bank-
rupt has acted in bad faith. This unsoundness is due basically to the
conflict which arises between the powers of the bankruptcy trustee
and normal anticipatory breach procedures as delineated by the
Uniform Commercial Code 4
In addition to being unsound, the general rule would also be
unnecessary in bad faith cases because of the basic rule of require-
ment contracts that a bad faith cessation of business is a present
breach upon the cessation.' 5 Since there would be a present breach
whenever a bad faith cessation occurred before the bankruptcy
petition was filed, the requirements seller would have a provable
claim under section 63a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act 0 as a debt on an
express contract.
In those cases where the cessation does not occur until after the
petition is filed, the seller's claim would still seem to be provable.
9 Id.
10 Id.
" Id. at 675.
12 Western Fuel & Oil Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1957); Oregon
Plywood Sales Corp. v. Sutherlin Plywood Corp., 246 F.2d 466 (9th
Cir. 1957); IIML Corp. v. General Goods Corp., 365 F.2d 77 (3d Cir.
1966).
13 E.g., IEML Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d 77, 81 (3d Cir.
1966). "[T]he seller assumes the risk of all good faith variations in
the buyer's requirements even to the extent of a determination to
liquidate or discontinue the business."
14 For an article that succinctly points up the weaknesses in the general
rule, see Broude, Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy: The Case for
a Federal Common Law, 17 KAw. L. REv. 1 (1968).
15 Western Fuel & Oil Co. v. Kemp, 245 F.2d 633, 638 (8th Cir. 1957).
16 Bankruptcy Act § 63a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(4) (1964).
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Under section 70b "[t]he trustee shall assume or reject an executory
contract."'17
Unless the contract clearly provides that bankruptcy terminates
the contract or gives the other party the option to terminate, the
bankruptcy trustee cannot be prevented from exercising the privi-
lege vested in him by 70b of choosing whether to assume or reject
the contract.' 8
When the trustee acts under this power to reject an executory con-
tract, the rejection constitutes a breach of such contract as of the
date of the filing of the petition. 19 Thus, the implied requirement in
section 63a that the breach must have occurred before or upon the
filing of the petition" is satisfied, and claims resulting from the
breach are provable as claims upon an express contract under
63a(4).21
Notwithstanding the express language of section 70b, the ques-
tion may be raised whether section 70b should be applied at all to
requirement contracts as the trustee may not have the power to
accept this peculiar type of executory contract. The trustee's power
to accept under section 70b is correlated to section 70a from which
the trustee derives the title of the bankrupt as of the date of filing
the bankruptcy petition in regard to property specified in section
70a.22 Such property includes "property... which prior to the filing
of the petition [the bankrupt] could by any means have trans-
ferred.123 Therefore, the power of the trustee to accept a require-
ments contract is dependent upon whether the contract is trans-
ferable. This could be a barrier blocking acceptance of a require-
ments contract. There have been decisions in which the requirement
contracts involved have been held non-transferable due to their
personal nature.24
'7 Bankruptcy Act § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § lOb (1964).
18 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, Para. 70.43 at 535 (14th ed. 1967).
19 Bankruptcy Act § 63c, 11 U.S.C. § 103c (1964).
20 "That part of the present bankruptcy act which describes what debts
may be proved does not repeat at all points the words 'owing at the
filing of the petition,' but it is impossible to consider it other than as
though it did thus repeat them." In re Swift, 112 F. 315, 321 (1st Cir.
1901). There are now several exceptions to the above quote, one of
which specifically relates to express contracts, i.e., section 63a(8)
allows the provability of contingent debts.
21 Bankruptcy Act § 63a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(4) (1964).
22 Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § ll0a (1964).
23 Id.
24 E.g., Crane Ice Cream Co. v. Terminal Freezing & Heating Co., 147
Md. 588, 128 A. 280 (1925).
COMMENTS
If a requirements contract is considered non-transferable, ap-
parently section 70b would not be applicable. Therefore, the
seller's claim would be considered to have come into existence after
the bankruptcy petition was filed, making it a non-provable claim.
Feasibly, in a rare case, this problem might arise, but the interaction
between the Uniform Commercial Code, the Bankruptcy Act and
accepted contract principles would limit this possibility to insig-
nificance. In the vast majority of cases where the requirements
buyer is bankrupt, the trustee should be allowed to assume the
bankrupt's requirement contracts if desired. As Professor Mac-
Lachlan states, "[t]he Bankruptcy Act provides that the court may
authorize the business [of the bankrupt] to be conducted for
limited periods by... [the] trustees, if necessary in the best inter-
ests of the estate. '25 Since the trustee is allowed to operate the
bankrupt's business, he should, as a business necessity be allowed
to assume those contracts essential to the proper operation, whether
they be requirement contracts or otherwise.
This assumption, though it may cause minor hardships for the
seller, could not be used to the disadvantage of the seller by the
order of an unreasonable quantity of goods. The seller would still
be protected from such orders by the trustee under the stipulation
in section 2-306 of the Uniform Commercial Code that "no quantity
unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the
absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable
prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded."26
Therefore, with the aid of sections 63a(4) and 70b, it is evident
that a seller need not rely on the antiquated general rule that
bankruptcy is an anticipatory breach of an executory contract to
prove his claims arising from a bad faith breach by a requirements
buyer. However, even with these two useful sections of the act,
under present case law as developed in United Cigar and expanded
upon by later cases,2 the seller, in the majority of cessations of
business involving bankruptcy, will still be left without a claim
just as the seller in United Cigar.
The court in United Cigar felt that under a test of "good faith,"
the bankrupt did not have an obligation to continue to have require-
ments, but was only bound to buy from the seller to the extent "that
he may have requirements when he is left free to deal with his
business as he may deem best, provided his conduct is bona fide."28
25 J. MAcLAcHLA., BANKRUPTCY § 85 at 76 (1956).
26 UNiFoRmI CoiVnnncmEI CODE § 2-306 [hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
27 Cases cited note 12 supra.
28 In re United Cigar Stores, 72 F.2d 673, 675 (2d Cir. 1934).
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Other courts have been reluctant to follow such a rule in toto and
have implied a duty on the buyer to remain in business for the
length of the contract.29 However, the position taken by the court
in United Cigar still predominates, but whether that position is
completely sound is now at least questionable. In deciding if bank-
ruptcy is considered a breach, the question is generally considered
a matter of state law. ° United Cigar was decided under New York
law that has since been superseded, in New York and forty-eight
other states, by the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code.
THE "GOOD FAITH" REQUIREMENT IN BANKRUPTCY
At first glance it might seem that the Uniform Commercial Code
does not significantly change the United Cigar rule. The basic
requirement of "good faith" is still retained in section 2-306, but
the draftsmen of the Code have attempted to define this previously
undefined term. In section 1-201(19) the general definition of "good
faith" is "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned."'
This basic definition is qualified by section 2-103(b) which states
that "'[g]ood faith' in the case of a merchant means honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade." 2 In addition to the "good faith" requirement
there is the further limitation in section 2-306 that "no quantity
unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in the ab-
sence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise comparable
prior output or requirements may be tendered or demanded.3 3
Comment 2 to section 2-306 also provides an example of what would
possibly be considered bad faith action, i.e., a shutdown merely to
curtail losses.3 4 This clearly would be an evasion of the spirit of the
contract. "Some judges recognize that to evade the spirit of a deal
is to act in bad faith and thus is to commit a breach."3 15 "Under the
29 E.g., Diamond Alkali Co. v. P. C. Tomson & Co., 35 F.2d 117, 119 (3d
Cir. 1929). "Whenever a contract cannot be carried out in the way it
was obviously expected that it would be carried out without one party
or the other performing some act not expressly promised by him, a
promise to do that act must be implied."
30 In re Robertson, 41 F. Supp. 665, 668 (W.D. Ark. 1941). But see Broude,
Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy: The Case for a Federal Com-
mon Law, 17 KA . L. REV. 1 (1968).
31 U.C.C. § 1-201(19).
32 U.C.C. § 2-103 (1) (b).
33 U.C.C. § 2-306(1).
34 U.C.C. § 2-306, Comment 2.
35 Summers, "Good Faith" In General Contract Law and the Sales
Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195, 234
(1968).
COMMENTS
... Code, some courts are likely to say there is a general principle
of law that the spirit of the deal is, within limits, just as much
a part of that deal as its letter."36
Nevertheless, even with this effort to elucidate their "good faith"
requirement, the draftsmen still failed to eliminate the uncertainty
relating to requirement contracts in bankruptcy by failing to take
a position at all as to the provability of requirement contract claims
in bankruptcy.37 Such a position in the face of United Cigar and
other case law in the area is puzzling to say the least. True, in many
of these cases it was held that there was no provable claim. How-
ever, that was simply because it was determined that the bankrupts
had acted in good faith; consequently, there had not been a breach 8
In none of these cases was it stated that there would not have been
a breach if the bankrupts had acted in bad faith, nor that claims
from breaches of requirement contracts were not provable in bank-
ruptcy. There would now seem to be no obstacle in the path of a
court to determine that such claims are provable, especially in
the case of a voluntary bankruptcy. Courts may still be hesitant in
implying a breach from the cessation of business due to a voluntary
bankruptcy, but with the aid of Comment 2 of section' 2-306, a
voluntary bankruptcy instituted with the principle motive of cur-
tailing losses would have all the characteristics of a bad faith
cessation.
In the case of a cessation due to an involuntary bankruptcy of
a requirements buyer, it would be more difficult to show that the
bankruptcy was incident to the bankrupt's motive of curtailing
losses. Obviously, if the bankrupt acted in collusion with any of
his creditors to induce them to file a bankruptcy petition against
him, the requisite bad faith would be clearly evident. However,
that would seldom be a typical situation; instead of such open action
the bankrupt would normally allow his affairs to fall into such a
state of disrepair that an involuntary bankruptcy petition would
be the only resort of his creditors. For a court to distinguish
between the deliberate action of a company that wants to be thrown
into bankruptcy and the action of a company that is doing every-
thing within its power to stave off an involuntary petition could be
a difficult, if not an impossible, task. Rather than taking this
30 Id. at 235.
37 'This article takes no position as to whether a requirements contract
is a provable claim in bankruptcy." U.C.C. § 2-306, Comment 2.
38 In re United Cigar Stores, 72 F.2d 673, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1934); Ore-
gon Plywood Sales Corp. v. Sutherlin Plywood Corp., 246 F.2d 466,
471 (9th Cir. 1957); IEML Corp v. General Foods Corp., 365 F.2d
77, 82-83 (3d Cir. 1966).
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approach, a better solution would be for the court to attempt to
distinguish between a voluntary and an involuntary bankruptcy.
This could be accomplished by providing in the case of a voluntary
bankruptcy that the burden of proof of good faith action would be
on the bankrupt buyer instead of following the normal procedure
of placing the burden of proving the breach on the non-breaching
party. This distinction would be useful in placing the burden of
proof, that the bankruptcy was in good faith, on the bankrupt, but
only when it had chosen to cease business and would be in the
better position to prove whether the cessation was made in good
faith.
Such a policy would be in line with the definition of "good faith"
in section 1-201(19), in conjunction with section 2-306(1) and the
comments that follow, because it would seem likely that a require-
ments buyer is acting in as much bad faith by filing a voluntary
petition as he would be in ceasing operations to curtail losses. How-
ever, in a case of cessation of business due to an involuntary pro-
ceeding, the fact that the alleged bankrupt has merely continued
operating until he was forced to stop is strong evidence that he has
not acted in bad faith.
Whatever procedure the courts may choose, when it is deter-
mined that a buyer has acted in bad faith by filing a voluntary
petition or in allowing an involuntary petition to be filed against
him, such a breach, as previously mentioned, would be a provable
claim under section 63a(4) alone, or in conjunction with 70b.
CONCLUSION
The rules laid down in United Cigar are no longer the controlling
principles for requirement contracts in bankruptcy. The Uniform
Commercial Code in section 2-306 (1), in conjunction with the defi-
nition of "good faith" in section 2-103 (1) (b), has not made new
law but has simply achieved the purpose of the Code, which is to
clarify, modernize and simplify existing law.3 9 By delineating a
standard of "good faith," the Code has furnished the courts a cri-
terion whereby it is now possible to evaluate a bankrupt's motives
in filing a voluntary petition or in allowing creditors to throw it
into bankruptcy. However, to provide a workable system, it may
be necessary to place the burden of proof of "good faith" action on
the bankrupt when a voluntary petition is involved.
39 U.C.C. § 1-102.
COMMENTS
If the court should find that the bankrupt acted in bad faith, the
requirements seller will have a provable claim in the bankruptcy
proceedings. In this manner, then, the Code has provided for the
provability of requirement contracts in bankruptcy and has taken
a step forward in advancing one of the major purposes of the Bank-
ruptcy Act: the distribution of the estate of the bankrupt to the
creditors.40
Gary B. Pingel '70
40 Burlingham v. Crouse, 228 U.S. 459, 473 (1913).
